Posts Tagged ‘Ukraine-Russia War’

by Steve Young, Lt Col (ret’d), Canadian Army

The following is a guest post by my good friend, Steve Young. It’s his estimate of the situation, and pretty darn good. Enjoy. And please let me know if you like these guest reports. I have a lot of friends and colleagues who can provide unique and deep insight into the war in Ukraine and other strategic topics.

Executive Summary

Ukraine has strategically held their lines since reclaiming land in the fall, preparing for a counter-offensive against Russia. Ukraine’s plan involves a highly coordinated assault using various military assets to break Russian defences and exploit the breakthrough. The operation requires significant resources and coordination. Ukraine’s forces are better trained and globally supported, while Russia faces challenges with poor equipment, training, and leadership. The conflict’s outcome looks unfavourable for Russia, with the situation in Crimea remaining uncertain.

Ukraine Estimate

I have been getting some questions on what is happening, so I thought I would post something a bit long. 

So what has been happening since Ukraine took back a large chunk of land back in the fall?  Well, basically, Ukraine chased the Russians back as far as they thought prudent without exposing themselves to counter-attack. Russia went on the defensive and managed to stabilize their lines. When the New Year began, Russia started attacking all across the lines of contact, but more particularly in the regions of Bakhmut and Vuledar. Vuledar didn’t go so well – the Russians lost the bulk of their mechanized forces in several amateurish attacks that failed spectacularly. They had some limited success with dismounted infantry in Bakhmut but have lost most of their gains over the past week. And Russia is losing between 750 and 1,000 soldiers a day with little to show for it. Bakhmut holds. 

Ukraine is caught between trying to hold their lines with as few resources as possible while building up for an eventual counter-offensive. It must be heartbreaking to see all the casualties come back from the front lines while fresh troops and equipment are not committed to the fight, but Ukraine has a sound plan and they must persevere.  We call such operations Economy of Effort, but that doesn’t make it any easier to see the casualties pile up. 

The eventual counter-offensive will require a mix of reconnaissance, combat engineers, heavy tanks, artillery, mechanized infantry and wheeled logistics, plus any air and aviation assets they can muster. I figure Ukraine will require somewhere North of 500,000 soldiers, likely double that if they can field that many forces.  Offensive operations, properly done, are resource intensive. Some of the initial moves may have already begun. You may have noticed that Ukrainian reconnaissance activity has picked up of late, and that they are targeting artillery and air defence assets as a priority. 

The first step will be a highly choreographed assault to break through Russian defensive positions.  They’ll likely try to break through in two places, hoping to get at least one. You will see the heaviest equipment used here:  Abrams, Challenger and Leopard tanks, Bradley and Marder fighting vehicles, lots of artillery and even air support. My guess is that they have been practising all winter. It takes training and a lot of coordination to get everything done properly. That part should go well, and Ukraine is likely to slice through the Russian lines without much difficulty, albeit at the cost of considerable expenditure of scarce resources. 

The next step is to try and exploit the breakthrough, to change the initial tactical success into something more, hopefully something that would cause the Russian line to collapse entirely. This part will see the older Leopard 1 tanks, the French AMX-RC wheeled “tankettes”, jeeps, armoured personnel carriers and anything armoured and fast. All supplies, fuel and ammunition will need to be on wheels, so a lot of trucks will be required. The job of this second force is to destroy supply dumps, staging areas, repair depots, command posts and, most importantly, air defence systems. They’ll need to move quickly but should be mostly unopposed since Russia hasn’t kept much in Reserve for such contingencies. I am guessing that there will be no small amount of partisan support to assist along the way. 

Importantly, they’ll need to do something decisive such as cut the Russian forces in two or surround a large number of troops.  

This second part can’t be rehearsed as much. Commanders will have to rely on the initiative of their subordinate leaders, and trust that they will do the right thing. It will likely be quick and chaotic, hopefully causing the poorly led Russians to cut and run and/or surrender.  If, somehow, that second part doesn’t work out, it might be some time before Ukraine could muster the necessary resources to try again. For me, I’ll be watching this second part closely. 

My guess is that they’ll head to Mariupol.

Anyway, for what it is worth, some things have not changed much. Russia has poor equipment, little to no training, poor leadership and poor doctrine. They have quantity on their side, which has a quality all its own (Stalin’s words), but little else. The only possible way they could capture Kiev is to walk the whole 600 km. They continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, breaking conventions to which they are signatories. Ukraine has the support of most of the world, their training outclasses the Russians and they are unified in their aim to expel Russia. This isn’t going to end well for Russia. 

And what about Crimea? If indeed the the Russian defence collapses, it may not be necessary to fight over Crimea. Let’s hope so.

©️Steve Young

By Richard Martin

There is a widespread belief that Russia’s war of aggression and conquest in Ukraine was somehow caused by the US and, especially, NATO enlargement. This is false. Russia’s aggressive and provocative stance has been consistently driven by its leadership’s drive to reestablish its suzerainty over its former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries.

Russia justifies its hegemonic and imperialist aims and actions by claiming that NATO threatens it. This is a complete lie, one that, moreover, is reinforced by ethically-challenged so-called “realist” historians and theorists, including Henry Kissinger and, especially, John Mearsheimer.

The basis of Russia’s claims and actions and that of the “realist” geopolitical hacks is that nations and people within Russia’s “sphere of influence” must respect Russia’s right to dominate them and exploit them as its leaders and people see fit. If there is a more anti-liberal and anti-democratic stance in the world today, I don’t know of it. Russian imperialists are one thing, but the fact that supposedly well-informed Western intellectuals like Kissinger and Mearsheimer still uphold these values is beyond the pale.

People, many of whom should know better, need to reacquaint themselves with the founding principals of Western, liberal, democratic values and ethics, and the political, economic and social consequences derived therefrom. It is also crucial to be aware of the FACTS about Russian claims, instead of sound bites, disinformation, and propaganda injects into Western media, corporate and social. To this end, I’m including a list of useful links to factual information and reports concerning NATO, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.

If you want to share your views, go right ahead, as I believe in free speech and open debate and dialogue. With that said, it should be done from a position of knowledge and understanding of actual facts and events, not uninformed commentary on the basis of fears, uncertainty, and doubt.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO%E2%80%93Russia_relations

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm

https://www.nato.int/…/20120705_0919-12-Fiche-Info-NATO…

par Richard Martin

Il existe une croyance répandue selon laquelle la guerre d’agression et de conquête de la Russie en Ukraine a été en quelque sorte causée par les États-Unis et, surtout, par l’élargissement de l’OTAN. C’est faux. L’attitude agressive et provocatrice de la Russie a toujours été motivée par la volonté de ses dirigeants de rétablir sa suzeraineté sur les anciennes républiques soviétiques et les pays du Pacte de Varsovie.

La Russie justifie ses objectifs et ses actions hégémoniques et impérialistes en affirmant que l’OTAN la menace. Il s’agit d’un mensonge total, qui est d’ailleurs renforcé par des historiens et théoriciens dits “réalistes”, contestés sur le plan éthique, dont Henry Kissinger et, surtout, John Mearsheimer.

La base des revendications et des actions de la Russie et des apologistes géopolitiques “réalistes” est que les nations et les peuples de la “sphère d’influence” de la Russie doivent respecter le droit de la Russie à les dominer et à les exploiter comme ses dirigeants et son peuple l’entendent. S’il existe une position plus anti-libérale et anti-démocratique dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, je ne la connais pas. Les impérialistes russes sont une chose, mais le fait que des intellectuels occidentaux soi-disant bien informés comme Kissinger et Mearsheimer défendent encore ces valeurs est inacceptable.

Les gens, dont beaucoup devraient être mieux informés, doivent se réapproprier les principes fondateurs des valeurs et de l’éthique occidentales, libérales et démocratiques, ainsi que les conséquences politiques, économiques et sociales qui en découlent. Il est également crucial de connaître les FAITS concernant les revendications russes, au lieu des extraits sonores, de la désinformation et de la propagande injectés dans les médias occidentaux, commerciaux et sociaux. À cette fin, j’ai inclus une liste de liens utiles vers des informations et des rapports factuels concernant l’OTAN, la Russie, l’Ukraine et la Géorgie.

Si vous voulez partager vos opinions, allez-y, car je crois en la liberté d’expression, au débat ouvert et au dialogue. Cela dit, il faut le faire à partir d’une position de connaissance et de compréhension des faits et des événements réels, et non pas à partir de commentaires non informés fondés sur des craintes, des incertitudes et des doutes.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm…

https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/topics_50090.htm

https://fr.wikipedia.org/…/Relations_entre_la_Russie_et…

BY RICHARD MARTIN

Here is my current assessment of the situation post liberation of Kherson.

See the diagram I’ve attached (map courtesy of Institute for the Study of War’s interactive map; hand drawn markings are mine).

The thick green line shows where the Russians have apparently developed extensive defensive positions on the left bank of the Dnipro. Open sources claim they have built three lines of defence, which is classic Soviet doctrine.

The thick red circle around Donetsk is where the Wagner Group has been active over the last several months, with many failed attacks against the small city of Bakhmut. The Ukrainians have successfully held them off over at least 2 months. It’s not clear to me what the Russian intent is, but I believe the aim is to fix Ukrainian forces so they can’t redeploy to other parts of the front while keeping them as far away from Donetsk as possible, and possibly even push them back. Donetsk is very important and symbolic for the Russian attempt to conquer and annex Ukraine.

The thick red oval east of Kharkiv shows a number of small scale Russian attempts at attacks and reconnaissance in force missions. I suspect the intent is also to fix Ukrainian forces while buying time to build up the defences of Svatove, a major communications hub.

The thin blue circles show the areas of major Ukrainian partisan activity. As you can see, it is extensive in the area of Melitopol with a lot also in Berdiansk and Mariupol, and also in the eastern area north of Lysichansk.

I believe the Ukrainian main effort will move to the centre, east of the Kakhovka Reservoir and into Zaporizhzhia Oblast. They might make for Melitopol and even Berdiansk and try to cut the lateral lines of communication near the coast. I don’t think they will try an assault crossing on the lower Dnipro because of the Russian defences on the left bank and the fact they have had several weeks to prepare, not to mention the fact that it would take significant bridging and amphibious capabilities by Ukrainian forces.

© Richard Martin

Source: Institute for the Study of War Interactive Map (https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) accessed 12 November 2022. Hand drawn additions by Richard Martin.