Posts Tagged ‘Russia’

by Richard Martin

There are NO, I repeat, NO, independent power sources in Russia. In that it is a typical autocratic dictatorship. Anyone who opposes Putin and the Kremlin apparatus, openly or secretly, gets “fallen” out of a window, poisoned, arrested on trumped up charges and sent to Siberia. That includes the robber baron oligarchs, all news and media, the judiciary, governors and assemblies of the so-called republics, oblasts, cities, towns, etc.

He has numerous agencies, official (e.g., the armed forces and FSB) and unofficial (Wagner, the Internet Research Agency) in competition vying for his approval and attention. They have overlapping functions, which is completely intentional. They are run by people who are personally loyal to Putin or to people who are.

All individual wealth, influence, and power is held at the sufferance of Putin. As soon as someone with official or unofficial delegated powers steps out of line, they are warned or disappeared in some way. Their wealth is confiscated and distributed to other cronies.

By Richard Martin

Thanks to Professor Sean Maloney of RMC for naming what happened in Russia on 23-24 June 2023. We can analyze the events, but we can’t apply a Western framework or look at them through a liberal-democratic lens. 

Putin, Kremlin operators, siloviki, Wagner and other mercenary groups, are nothing but opportunists seeking power and wealth. There are multiple security agencies and forces within the state apparatus which can play a part. People are loyal to individuals, not the constitution or the people or even the state. The state for these strongmen is a means to an end. When they can no longer get what they want from the existing network, they will make a play to rearrange it in their favour, or at least position themselves to wait out the changes.

What this is not: a mutiny, popular uprising, foco, or a coup d’état. Mutiny may be feeding the putsch, but if the troops had wanted to mutiny en masse (it has happened in pockets prior to the Wagner putsch), they would have done so by now. Mutiny also implies that the troops are no longer okay with the mission, and just don’t want to be slaughtered or treated like cattle for nothing. There is no indication, yet, that there is sufficient discontent or organized resistance within the ranks.

There is also no uprising on in Russia, although there may be much popular discontent and rebelliousness and the situation can change quickly. Most people, including local and provincial government authorities will wait to see which way the wind is blowing. As for a coup, that would be staged from within the immediate circle of power, the Kremlin, or at the most Moscow, and would have to involve those closest to Putin and within his security apparatus and network.

This is a putsch, a push for power by a group, usually from outside the capital. It involves turning groups and leaders against the central government, especially those in control of security and military forces. A historical analogy is to be found in imperial Rome, where rebellions almost always started in the provinces, usually Gaul, Hispanic, or Syria, because there was a good wealth base, and during a period of instability or a losing war/battle.

Soldiers in various legions would proclaim their general as imperator, which means victor, or great commander. Then they would march on Rome or to meet opposing forces in battle who trying to do the same thing. Sometimes, there would be forces loyal to the reigning emperor who would try to support him. The motivation was a play for power and wealth. Those supporting the leaders throw in with the one they think will guarantee them the best spoils or, alternatively, avoid them being killed.

Another analogy is a game of musical chairs. The music is cacophonous, with instruments out of tune, multiple scores, and several conductors. No one knows when the music will stop. Some key players are jockeying for position, while others are waiting in the wings to try to get to a chair or to fall in behind the winner(s).

I think the trigger for Prigozhin to launch his putsch was the incursions in the Belgorod region a few weeks ago by Russian rebels supported by Ukrainian capabilities. When he saw how weak the forces outside of Ukraine were, he felt he could reach Moscow quickly if he could rally enough support.

When Prigozhin realized he didn’t have enough units coming over to him, and especially the internal security forces, that’s when he called off the march on Moscow. It had nothing to do with buses and trucks blocking the highway or “negotiations.” His putsch failed, as most do, because he gambled and lost.

It’s also interesting to note that the Kremlin keeps its best forces to protect Moscow and the Kremlin (which literally means fortress). In Russia, all roads lead to Moscow, so it’s part of the mentality that it must be protected at all costs.

None of these strongmen are democrats or true reformers. They are fighting to see who will be on top of the pyramid, nothing more. And that includes Saint Navalny and Khodorkovsky the former oligarch. They have no honour and will throw each other under the tank if they think it will advance their chances of moving up the hierarchy.

It’s also important to mention that none of these men thinks the idea of invading Ukraine was a bad idea. They all want it and will do everything they can to continue the war. And can we finally lay to rest the idea of peace feelers, peace talks, giving peace a chance? They need to be wiped out.

© 2023 Richard Martin

by Steve Young, Lt Col (ret’d), Canadian Army

The following is a guest post by my good friend, Steve Young. It’s his estimate of the situation, and pretty darn good. Enjoy. And please let me know if you like these guest reports. I have a lot of friends and colleagues who can provide unique and deep insight into the war in Ukraine and other strategic topics.

Executive Summary

Ukraine has strategically held their lines since reclaiming land in the fall, preparing for a counter-offensive against Russia. Ukraine’s plan involves a highly coordinated assault using various military assets to break Russian defences and exploit the breakthrough. The operation requires significant resources and coordination. Ukraine’s forces are better trained and globally supported, while Russia faces challenges with poor equipment, training, and leadership. The conflict’s outcome looks unfavourable for Russia, with the situation in Crimea remaining uncertain.

Ukraine Estimate

I have been getting some questions on what is happening, so I thought I would post something a bit long. 

So what has been happening since Ukraine took back a large chunk of land back in the fall?  Well, basically, Ukraine chased the Russians back as far as they thought prudent without exposing themselves to counter-attack. Russia went on the defensive and managed to stabilize their lines. When the New Year began, Russia started attacking all across the lines of contact, but more particularly in the regions of Bakhmut and Vuledar. Vuledar didn’t go so well – the Russians lost the bulk of their mechanized forces in several amateurish attacks that failed spectacularly. They had some limited success with dismounted infantry in Bakhmut but have lost most of their gains over the past week. And Russia is losing between 750 and 1,000 soldiers a day with little to show for it. Bakhmut holds. 

Ukraine is caught between trying to hold their lines with as few resources as possible while building up for an eventual counter-offensive. It must be heartbreaking to see all the casualties come back from the front lines while fresh troops and equipment are not committed to the fight, but Ukraine has a sound plan and they must persevere.  We call such operations Economy of Effort, but that doesn’t make it any easier to see the casualties pile up. 

The eventual counter-offensive will require a mix of reconnaissance, combat engineers, heavy tanks, artillery, mechanized infantry and wheeled logistics, plus any air and aviation assets they can muster. I figure Ukraine will require somewhere North of 500,000 soldiers, likely double that if they can field that many forces.  Offensive operations, properly done, are resource intensive. Some of the initial moves may have already begun. You may have noticed that Ukrainian reconnaissance activity has picked up of late, and that they are targeting artillery and air defence assets as a priority. 

The first step will be a highly choreographed assault to break through Russian defensive positions.  They’ll likely try to break through in two places, hoping to get at least one. You will see the heaviest equipment used here:  Abrams, Challenger and Leopard tanks, Bradley and Marder fighting vehicles, lots of artillery and even air support. My guess is that they have been practising all winter. It takes training and a lot of coordination to get everything done properly. That part should go well, and Ukraine is likely to slice through the Russian lines without much difficulty, albeit at the cost of considerable expenditure of scarce resources. 

The next step is to try and exploit the breakthrough, to change the initial tactical success into something more, hopefully something that would cause the Russian line to collapse entirely. This part will see the older Leopard 1 tanks, the French AMX-RC wheeled “tankettes”, jeeps, armoured personnel carriers and anything armoured and fast. All supplies, fuel and ammunition will need to be on wheels, so a lot of trucks will be required. The job of this second force is to destroy supply dumps, staging areas, repair depots, command posts and, most importantly, air defence systems. They’ll need to move quickly but should be mostly unopposed since Russia hasn’t kept much in Reserve for such contingencies. I am guessing that there will be no small amount of partisan support to assist along the way. 

Importantly, they’ll need to do something decisive such as cut the Russian forces in two or surround a large number of troops.  

This second part can’t be rehearsed as much. Commanders will have to rely on the initiative of their subordinate leaders, and trust that they will do the right thing. It will likely be quick and chaotic, hopefully causing the poorly led Russians to cut and run and/or surrender.  If, somehow, that second part doesn’t work out, it might be some time before Ukraine could muster the necessary resources to try again. For me, I’ll be watching this second part closely. 

My guess is that they’ll head to Mariupol.

Anyway, for what it is worth, some things have not changed much. Russia has poor equipment, little to no training, poor leadership and poor doctrine. They have quantity on their side, which has a quality all its own (Stalin’s words), but little else. The only possible way they could capture Kiev is to walk the whole 600 km. They continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, breaking conventions to which they are signatories. Ukraine has the support of most of the world, their training outclasses the Russians and they are unified in their aim to expel Russia. This isn’t going to end well for Russia. 

And what about Crimea? If indeed the the Russian defence collapses, it may not be necessary to fight over Crimea. Let’s hope so.

©️Steve Young

By Richard Martin

There is a widespread belief that Russia’s war of aggression and conquest in Ukraine was somehow caused by the US and, especially, NATO enlargement. This is false. Russia’s aggressive and provocative stance has been consistently driven by its leadership’s drive to reestablish its suzerainty over its former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries.

Russia justifies its hegemonic and imperialist aims and actions by claiming that NATO threatens it. This is a complete lie, one that, moreover, is reinforced by ethically-challenged so-called “realist” historians and theorists, including Henry Kissinger and, especially, John Mearsheimer.

The basis of Russia’s claims and actions and that of the “realist” geopolitical hacks is that nations and people within Russia’s “sphere of influence” must respect Russia’s right to dominate them and exploit them as its leaders and people see fit. If there is a more anti-liberal and anti-democratic stance in the world today, I don’t know of it. Russian imperialists are one thing, but the fact that supposedly well-informed Western intellectuals like Kissinger and Mearsheimer still uphold these values is beyond the pale.

People, many of whom should know better, need to reacquaint themselves with the founding principals of Western, liberal, democratic values and ethics, and the political, economic and social consequences derived therefrom. It is also crucial to be aware of the FACTS about Russian claims, instead of sound bites, disinformation, and propaganda injects into Western media, corporate and social. To this end, I’m including a list of useful links to factual information and reports concerning NATO, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.

If you want to share your views, go right ahead, as I believe in free speech and open debate and dialogue. With that said, it should be done from a position of knowledge and understanding of actual facts and events, not uninformed commentary on the basis of fears, uncertainty, and doubt.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO%E2%80%93Russia_relations

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm

https://www.nato.int/…/20120705_0919-12-Fiche-Info-NATO…

BY RICHARD MARTIN

Here is my current assessment of the situation post liberation of Kherson.

See the diagram I’ve attached (map courtesy of Institute for the Study of War’s interactive map; hand drawn markings are mine).

The thick green line shows where the Russians have apparently developed extensive defensive positions on the left bank of the Dnipro. Open sources claim they have built three lines of defence, which is classic Soviet doctrine.

The thick red circle around Donetsk is where the Wagner Group has been active over the last several months, with many failed attacks against the small city of Bakhmut. The Ukrainians have successfully held them off over at least 2 months. It’s not clear to me what the Russian intent is, but I believe the aim is to fix Ukrainian forces so they can’t redeploy to other parts of the front while keeping them as far away from Donetsk as possible, and possibly even push them back. Donetsk is very important and symbolic for the Russian attempt to conquer and annex Ukraine.

The thick red oval east of Kharkiv shows a number of small scale Russian attempts at attacks and reconnaissance in force missions. I suspect the intent is also to fix Ukrainian forces while buying time to build up the defences of Svatove, a major communications hub.

The thin blue circles show the areas of major Ukrainian partisan activity. As you can see, it is extensive in the area of Melitopol with a lot also in Berdiansk and Mariupol, and also in the eastern area north of Lysichansk.

I believe the Ukrainian main effort will move to the centre, east of the Kakhovka Reservoir and into Zaporizhzhia Oblast. They might make for Melitopol and even Berdiansk and try to cut the lateral lines of communication near the coast. I don’t think they will try an assault crossing on the lower Dnipro because of the Russian defences on the left bank and the fact they have had several weeks to prepare, not to mention the fact that it would take significant bridging and amphibious capabilities by Ukrainian forces.

© Richard Martin

Source: Institute for the Study of War Interactive Map (https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) accessed 12 November 2022. Hand drawn additions by Richard Martin.

By Richard Martin

Many people seem to assume that democratization of Russia will solve the main problem, which is Russian imperialism and expansionism. The immediate aim is to support Ukraine in its struggle to free itself from Russian occupation and agression through military action by supplying the physical means and resources to do so. Whether Russia becomes democratic as an outcome or through the workings of these actions is irrelevant from the standpoint of the grand strategic aim of winning the war.

I don’t think there is necessarily a need for an “internal drive” toward democracy. The current mindset of the majority of Ukrainians proves the point. Ukrainians have pretty consistently sought national self-determination throughout their history, regardless of the form of government or constitution. They were resigned to live under Russian hegemony since at least the early 19th century. The turnabout started in 1991, before which there was no more a history or tradition of Ukrainian democracy than in Russia or any of the other Soviet satrapies.

If the Ukrainian people can change their mindset in the space of 30 years then, so can the Russians. But that should give us an idea of the time that is needed to effect the transition.

The Japanese, Germans and Italians adopted democracy after WWII as a result of total defeat and humiliation. The likelihood that Russia will be in such abject straights at the end of the current war is, for all intents and purposes, nil.

Russia is currently deterred from further escalation by NATO and, especially, the US nuclear umbrella and material support to Ukraine. The Ukrainians are training and preparing for a long-term struggle and, even more significant, the need to continue deterring Russia post-liberation of their country.

We in the West and NATO must accept that whatever the immediate outcome in Ukraine, Russia (and its dubious allies) will have to be contained and deterred for the foreseeable future. And that’s regardless of what happens to Putin and his henchmen.

© Richard Martin

A STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

By Richard Martin, President, Canadian Academy of Leadership and Development of Human Capital

The Situation

Individuals in our societies spend significant time and resources watching or reading online media and content. We are not going back to the days of limited television options and a few (inter)national news sources. In younger generations, the scale of online participation is staggering as compared to older ones. This is because younger people do not rely on traditional, “mainstream” sources of information. They live in the ephemeral, evanescent world of social media and crowd-sourced content platforms, much of which is of doubtful provenance and intent.

The result is that younger people are flooded with competing or contradictory ideas, ideologies, and influences through social media, amplified by influencers of questionable association and intent; word of mouth; educational institutions; civil society organizations; advertising; and variant lifestyles. These messages are not necessarily (though many are) negative or corrosive of core civic values though an important portion do offer a narrative unsupportive or questioning of our stable, secure, liberal, prosperous democracies. Some channels and sources of information favour social disorder and subversion with the goal of undermining Western resilience, defence, values, and objectives.

Prominent social media platforms are the principal (though not exclusive) channels enabling the promotion of ideas and concepts that can erode the commitment to creating and sustaining peaceful and secure societies that value individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and which underlie the most prosperous societies in history. I believe these values are worth upholding, sustaining, and as required, defending. With that said, censorship and centralized control of information, whether public or private, are not the solution, as these go against the core values of the free, democratic, rules and rights-based order.

The Threat

Hostile powers and forces are relentlessly engaged in information operations to undermine the morale, resilience, and resolve of Western nations and their populations. Public awareness of this threat and its effects has increased since the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, but the focus is on Russia, leaving other state-based and state-sponsored actors to operate relatively unhindered below the radar of the public, politicians, and businesses. On the other hand, this awareness is hazy, limited, and non-specific. Individuals and organizations have little understanding of hostile intentions, strategies, operational approaches, and the specific techniques, tactics, and procedures that are used to achieve hostile ends.

The threat goes well beyond cyberattacks, disinformation, and misdirection. In fact, we believe that we have entered a new phase of information warfare which I call “epistemological warfare.” The aim of epistemological warfare isn’t just to attack nations and their populations with false, misleading, obfuscating, or confusing information and propaganda. It goes much further by launching a full-scale assault on the critical faculties and judgment of friendly nations, populations, and leaders.

The techniques are many but focus mainly on eroding critical thinking by overwhelming the public sphere, especially through social media channels and platforms, with false, doubtful, or contradictory information presented in sound bites, images, video clips, and Internet “memes” that exploit and reinforce well-known cognitive biases and fallacies. These include everything from non sequitur and tu quoque fallacies, to psychological heuristics such as the primacy effect, the bandwagon effect, and others too numerous to list. The apparent goal is to erode the ability of individuals to judge what is true and false, whom and what to believe, and whom to support. This results in a cynical and nihilistic attitude toward the facts, intentions, and objectives presented by and for contending powers and forces and undermines support for a strong defence against hostile intent and activities.

The Strategy

The effort to build societal resilience, especially in succeeding generations, depends on the ability to provide concrete tools that can be used quickly and effectively to resist, counter, and evaluate the claims, evidence, statements, and arguments that form the basis for disinformation, propaganda, and other hostile information activities. This requires a rational, systematic approach to the problem, one based on clear outcomes, deliverables, and methods.

The key to long-term, enduring success in building societal resistance is to focus on the succeeding generation of current and potential leaders who will become influencers, opinion formers and decision makers in the areas of public policy and administration, diplomacy, communications, business, finance and banking, public safety, and the profession of arms.

The centre of gravity in this effort is to develop and disseminate an intellectual and psychological toolkit to current and future young leaders to undergird individual and collective analyses and evaluations concerning the logical soundness and validity of the various claims, evidence, propositions, rhetoric, and arguments that are inserted and disseminated in the public domain.

The best way to equip our youth for resilience in the face of withering attacks of information and epistemological warfare is to help them recognize the different types of activities, with a view to reformulating them according to logical principles to evaluate their probability and overall validity. By this means, leaders of the successor generation will be better equipped to apply their own judgment through proven processes and methods of reasoning that are resilient and invariant across domains, topics, platforms, and content.

© Richard Martin

By Richard Martin

The West is engaged in an information war. Our youth are vulnerable to cynical and nihilistic ideas about the world. This erodes their resolve and resilience in the face of withering attacks that seek to undermine their ability to apply the cardinal virtues of judgment, justice, courage, and moderation.

However, we must ask how willing people are to stand up for their values and beliefs. Gallup conducted a worldwide poll in 2015, which found “that 61% of those polled across 64 countries would be willing to fight for their country, while 27% would not. However, there are significant differences by region. Willingness to fight is highest in the M.E.N.A. region (83%) while it is lowest in Western Europe (25%). A history of those countries in recent conflict provides an interesting comparison. The Japanese (11%) are the least likely of 64 countries polled to be willing to fight for their country. Results from Germany are similar – 18% willing to fight. By comparison these numbers more than double in the UK (27%) and France (29%).”[1]

Figure 1 – Source Gallup. The darker the shade of red, the higher the willingness to fight for one’s country.
Figure 3 – Source Gallup

The New York Times set up an online forum after the war in Ukraine (February 2022) started to garner comments from young people around the world. The following comment by a 15-year-old from B.C. is indicative: “When I first heard about the invasion, I thought it was a not going to be a big deal. Like what happened in 2020 with Iran shooting down a Ukrainian plane. I thought it was going to be talked about once then over with. But seeing the damage and tragedy that has taken place in Ukraine. I now know that this is extremely serious. My heart breaks for the people in Ukraine. This isn’t something you can just protest about or raise money for. This is real, and people are dying, I sincerely hope that the people in Ukraine are safe, I am 15 years old, and I don’t think my peers understand how terrifying it would be for someone to just take over your home and country by force.”[2]

Another high school student, this time from North Carolina: “There is so much uncertainty surrounding this. Before spiraling into anxious thoughts and endless worries, I had to think this through. As a Christian, I have hope. I know that worrying will not get me anywhere, and my beliefs help me to cope with this situation. There has been so much suffering in the world, but we have survived. This attack has put into perspective how lucky I am. It hurts to see people being so ungrateful to live in a country where we do not have to constantly worry about war, and death. I pray that we can do our part to help Ukraine, and I grieve with those who have lost their lives, family members, their homes, their security. My dad has brought up to me that my grandfather still has nightmares from hiding in bunkers during the Cold War, as a young child. The fact that more children are going through this hurts me. I stand with Ukraine.”[3]

Meanwhile, 18-year-old Ukrainian boys are leaving university and volunteering for military duty and are being deployed to the front lines with as little as 3 days of training.[4] Through the work of the International Forum for Peace, Security, and Prosperity (IFPSP), as well as personal experience, we know that there are young people willing to sign up for military service in NATO and EU countries. We also know that there are idealistic young people who volunteer for military academies to become the next generation of officers. However, even these motivated youths come to military college with preconceived notions about history, politics, economics, and society. Even in a military academy it can be an uphill struggle to convince officer cadets of the values of our nations and what we are trying to build, grow, and defend.[5]

How should we focus our efforts and resources to equip our youth against the nihilistic, cynical disinformation that seeks to undermine our society’s support for Peace, Security, and Prosperity?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resistance of the Ukrainian people, government and armed forces have provided the world and especially NATO countries with the focus and resolve to assist Ukraine in defending its independence and security in alignment with the fundamental NATO values of freedom, democracy, law, and rights. 

Russia is seeking to undermine these values by dominating Ukraine and its people while attacking the same values in other countries, and specifically within NATO and the EU. Russia has been consistently employing “hybrid” warfare techniques to undermine the resolve and morale of the peoples and nations that oppose Russian ways and means of achieving its aggressive ends.

To this end, Russia has been conducting information warfare and psychological operations against NATO and EU nations. The main approach involves using disinformation and other hostile information activities. There are two main goals. The first is to present the Russian point of view, to convince citizens, decision-makers, and influencers in NATO and EU countries to either support Russia’s war aims in Ukraine, or to undermine their support for their own nations’ commitment to supporting Ukraine and countering Russia. The second goal is to sow chaos, confusion, discord, and conflict within and between NATO/EU countries.

The first of these goals is familiar and is traditionally called propaganda. Although it is not pleasant, it is relatively easy to counter with facts and rational argument. The second goal is less familiar and resembles in many ways classic disinformation, misdirection, and active measures adopted by the Soviet Union and other Communist powers during the Cold War. It is much more insidious, as it aims at nothing less than eroding the ability of free-thinking individuals and groups to act effectively and efficiently in the face of threats to peace, security, and prosperity. In a nutshell, disinformation and active measures are forms of epistemological warfare.

Young people are probably the most vulnerable to epistemological warfare, as their ideas and habits of mind are still in development. They are highly vulnerable to disinformation, ideologies, and nihilistic questioning of the values and structures that uphold the values of freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Young people are idealistic, with many hopes and dreams about the future, both collective and personal, but these ideals are not tempered by the experience of living and the knowledge of history, values, and goals of our societies.

Epistemological warfare throws contradictory and inflammatory statements, observations, and opinions into the infosphere, especially social media, and sees what will stick. There is not necessarily an ideological standpoint that is upheld. The aim is not to say one side or opinion is better than another, but instead to sow doubt about what is real, and whether anyone in authority or with expertise is to be trusted. Disinformation about COVID-19, the actions of powerful and/or wealthy people, conspiracy theories, etc., are all grist for the mill.

© Richard Martin


[1] https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/33483/win-gallup-internationals-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country/

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/learning/what-students-are-saying-about-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/learning/what-students-are-saying-about-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html (emphasis added)

[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60724560

[5] Conversation with Dr. Sean M. Maloney, Professor of History, RMC of Canada

Neither side seems to have much of an advantage right now, but that could just indicate a build up for a major offensive. The Ukrainian MOD has recently announced that they now have 1 million under arms.

I remain of the opinion that UA is assembling forces and conducting artillery strikes preliminary to an offensive in the south, to recapture Kherson as an immediate objective, with the aim of cutting off Crimea and rolling up the RU flank from the west to the east. That would achieve a number of things, most notably threaten Crimea, which gives RU control over the northern Black Sea, which would then force RU to reassign forces to meet that threat, thus relieving pressure in the east and southeast. That could possibly then allow the UA to launch a supporting offensive to recapture Severodonestk, etc.

Well, that’s my arm chair assessment anyway.

© Richard Martin

by Richard Martin

I’m tired at the moral equivalence and hand-wringing. Horror at atrocities is one thing. Everyone can agree on that. In fact, it’s nothing but hand-wringing. “Give peace a chance.” “Why can’t we all just get along?” “Am I my brother’s keeper?”

Wars are fought on the moral as well as the physical plane. Everything I have learned in a 26-year military career as a combat arms officer, including peacekeeping duty in the Balkans, where many of the same type of genocidal and ethnic cleansing campaigns were undertaken, and 40 plus years of studying warfare, military history, strategy and tactics, confirms that belief.

The real issue is whether Western/NATO governments are willing to do what is necessary to ensure Russia is defeated and Ukraine is secure within its borders. Russian disinformation and information warfare is nothing but a continuation of Soviet-style active measures used extensively during the Cold War. The primary audience is the Russian people, followed closely by Western populations and politicians. Russian propaganda and information warfare are deep operations, aiming at undermining morale, resistance, and defence.

Messages are all over the place, including ridiculous conspiracy theories, in order to see what sticks and gets picked up and spread by mainstream media, social media and various movements and organizations. The hunger for strange beliefs is fed by Russian propaganda. The disinformation campaigns tap into fringe views and aim to exacerbate existing conflicts and divisions, on the left and the right, including anti-immigration fears, nationalism, fascist movements, extreme environmentalism and anti-business rhetoric.

Out of 100 ridiculous and unrealistic claims, maybe only 5 or 10 get picked up and shared. But then Russian state controlled agencies and influenced agents reinforce the narratives. The aim is to create doubt, sow discord, undermine support for Ukraine (or other threatened nations and countries), and weaken the resolve to resist aggression.

© Richard Martin

Richard Martin was an infantry officer for over 20 years in the Canadian Army. He is currently an entrepreneur, strategic advisor, and information warrior focusing on extracting valuable information and signals from chaos and noise.