Posts Tagged ‘Prigozhin’

Ukraine’s Summer Offensive

Posted: June 27, 2023 in War
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by Richard Martin

What we know: Prigozhin made a play for power and failed. Everything else in the public domain is pure speculation, most of it fuelled by rumours and intentional disinformation.

Regarding the offensive. The Ukrainians appear to have the initiative, therefore they are on the offensive. How that plays out tactically and operationally is another matter. The Russians have been trying different things, e.g., blowing the dam, but so far only to hinder and slow down movement. The Russian obstacles are, by all accounts, formidable.  It is a truism that obstacle breaching by forces under fire is the most complicated operation of all.

However, obstacles that aren’t covered by fire, direct and indirect, are merely a nuisance and will slow movement and manoeuvre, but only up to a point. It’s also important to point out that all fortifications are eventually defeated, either through destruction, breaching, or bypassing (therefore making them irrelevant).

I believe the Ukrainians are being very prudent in their tactical approach. They are unwilling to throw troops into battle without careful preparation and reconnaissance, and will substitute firepower and attrition as much as possible. They appear to be using small units to probe Russian positions and to draw out artillery fire so they can attack it with counter-battery fires. Over the last month or so, it seems that the number of Russian artillery systems destroyed has gone up significantly. The Ukrainians also seem to be focusing on destroying dual-capable systems, i.e., those that can fire nuclear as well as conventional munitions. The Russians call artillery the “god of war” for a reason. The Ukrainians appear to be wearing it down as much as possible.

The Ukrainians are also seeking to wear down Russian forces in depth, and command and control points. They are also attriting Russian logistics and supply capabilities, especially rail hubs, bridges, and other lines of communications, as well as ammunition dumps and troop concentrations.

I am more and more of the opinion that the Ukrainian strategy is to cause as much attrition as possible until such time as the Russians collapse somewhere. Then they can pour forces into the breach and seek to envelope enemy groupings and try to cut them off from retreat. A main objective must be to destroy as much Russian combat capability and kill or wound as many Russian soldiers as possible. This serves the tactical purpose of creating breakthrough opportunities. But, it also serves a longer term purpose of preventing the Russians from starting again if they are completely expelled from Ukraine. This is what they did to reconquer the Kharkiv and Kherson areas, and I see no reason for them to change their overall approach now.

Operationally, informed opinion converges around the idea that the Ukrainians would seek to cut the Russian forces in half by heading to Berdyansk and environs. This would isolate the Crimea from the rest of Russian occupied territory and make the situation there even more precarious.

Prigozhin’s Putsch

Posted: June 25, 2023 in War
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By Richard Martin

Thanks to Professor Sean Maloney of RMC for naming what happened in Russia on 23-24 June 2023. We can analyze the events, but we can’t apply a Western framework or look at them through a liberal-democratic lens. 

Putin, Kremlin operators, siloviki, Wagner and other mercenary groups, are nothing but opportunists seeking power and wealth. There are multiple security agencies and forces within the state apparatus which can play a part. People are loyal to individuals, not the constitution or the people or even the state. The state for these strongmen is a means to an end. When they can no longer get what they want from the existing network, they will make a play to rearrange it in their favour, or at least position themselves to wait out the changes.

What this is not: a mutiny, popular uprising, foco, or a coup d’état. Mutiny may be feeding the putsch, but if the troops had wanted to mutiny en masse (it has happened in pockets prior to the Wagner putsch), they would have done so by now. Mutiny also implies that the troops are no longer okay with the mission, and just don’t want to be slaughtered or treated like cattle for nothing. There is no indication, yet, that there is sufficient discontent or organized resistance within the ranks.

There is also no uprising on in Russia, although there may be much popular discontent and rebelliousness and the situation can change quickly. Most people, including local and provincial government authorities will wait to see which way the wind is blowing. As for a coup, that would be staged from within the immediate circle of power, the Kremlin, or at the most Moscow, and would have to involve those closest to Putin and within his security apparatus and network.

This is a putsch, a push for power by a group, usually from outside the capital. It involves turning groups and leaders against the central government, especially those in control of security and military forces. A historical analogy is to be found in imperial Rome, where rebellions almost always started in the provinces, usually Gaul, Hispanic, or Syria, because there was a good wealth base, and during a period of instability or a losing war/battle.

Soldiers in various legions would proclaim their general as imperator, which means victor, or great commander. Then they would march on Rome or to meet opposing forces in battle who trying to do the same thing. Sometimes, there would be forces loyal to the reigning emperor who would try to support him. The motivation was a play for power and wealth. Those supporting the leaders throw in with the one they think will guarantee them the best spoils or, alternatively, avoid them being killed.

Another analogy is a game of musical chairs. The music is cacophonous, with instruments out of tune, multiple scores, and several conductors. No one knows when the music will stop. Some key players are jockeying for position, while others are waiting in the wings to try to get to a chair or to fall in behind the winner(s).

I think the trigger for Prigozhin to launch his putsch was the incursions in the Belgorod region a few weeks ago by Russian rebels supported by Ukrainian capabilities. When he saw how weak the forces outside of Ukraine were, he felt he could reach Moscow quickly if he could rally enough support.

When Prigozhin realized he didn’t have enough units coming over to him, and especially the internal security forces, that’s when he called off the march on Moscow. It had nothing to do with buses and trucks blocking the highway or “negotiations.” His putsch failed, as most do, because he gambled and lost.

It’s also interesting to note that the Kremlin keeps its best forces to protect Moscow and the Kremlin (which literally means fortress). In Russia, all roads lead to Moscow, so it’s part of the mentality that it must be protected at all costs.

None of these strongmen are democrats or true reformers. They are fighting to see who will be on top of the pyramid, nothing more. And that includes Saint Navalny and Khodorkovsky the former oligarch. They have no honour and will throw each other under the tank if they think it will advance their chances of moving up the hierarchy.

It’s also important to mention that none of these men thinks the idea of invading Ukraine was a bad idea. They all want it and will do everything they can to continue the war. And can we finally lay to rest the idea of peace feelers, peace talks, giving peace a chance? They need to be wiped out.

© 2023 Richard Martin