Archive for the ‘Geopolitics’ Category

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By Richard Martin

The ongoing saga in Catalonia is an excellent illustration of how crucial it is to consider a range of scenarios before implementing a decision that could be heavy with consequences. And the scenarios shouldn’t all be rosy and positive for us. Consideration must be given to the worst-case possibility as well, so we know what we may be up against before acting. This entails a detailed consideration of competiting and opposing positions, as well as those of other stakeholders and bystanders. It also means preparing contingency plans for the most probable and dangerous possibilities so we aren’t caught flatfooted if they come to fruition.

A well-known radio commentator (and former politician) here in Montreal said this week that he had the impression that the Catalonian prime minister and regional authorities hadn’t really thought through the potential consequences of the independance referendum held a few weeks ago. I agree with him; both sides appear guilty of amateurish improvisation. It seems as though both the instigators of Catalonian independance and their opponents inside and outside Catalonia have given little or no thought to the inherent risks in their decisions and actions, as well as the range of possible responses of the Spanish government, population, businesses, and other countries. I also little or no evidence of forethought in securing international recognition for the referendum and subsequent moves. It’s as if it was all being driven by pure emotion, with not a lot of rational consideration of options.

Such conflicts usually build and fester over time until they reach a feverous level. And it takes two to tango. Threat generates counterthreat; action entails counteraction. Not all outcomes can be foreseen ahead of time, but a great many can be characterized to some extent and compared to see which are most probable and consequential. This is the essence of risk management.

Whether we’re talking about a political entity, a business, a non-profit organization or an individual person, prudent forethought should be given to the range of scenarios and options available or possible before deciding and acting. No forecasting or planning process is perfect, but the benefits of a disciplined and rigorous assessment of the situation and its various branches and outcomes will always pay dividends in better decision-making, management, and leadership. And this includes looking at the situation from your opponent’s or competitor’s standpoint. If I were to take this action, what would my opponent do?

It’s how we try to play sports and games, and it’s the essence of strategy, military, diplomatic, political, and commercial.

Copyright 2017 Alcera Consulting Inc.

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Voici mon premier article, intitulé « Le capital humain : Richesse ultime de l’Afrique », paru récemment dans le magazine Diplomat Investissement. Vous pouvez aussi le télécharger en version PDF.

Voir mon premier article pour le magazine Diplomat Investissement.

https://www.diplomatinvestissement.com/fr/news/2068/le-capital-humain-richesse-ultime-de-lafrique

by Richard Martin

© Kheng Guan Toh

I’ve been answering questions lately (from my daughters, among others) about the threat of war, specifically nuclear war. This obviously comes from the worries about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, as well as American ones.

Although this concerns military strategy and geopolitics, the underlying analytical approach can be applied to any consideration of threats, whether a generic SWOT analysis, or the evaluation of a specific security or competitive menace.

Threat analysis goes beyond risk analysis. Risk is the product of the probability and impact of a negative event or cause. Risks are usually categorized under three headings: natural, technological, and human. Focusing on the last, there are criminality, security, labour conflict and many other sub-categories of human originated risks. The problem, however, comes in evaluating the likelihood of a human risk. If we are considering only generic risks, we can talk about probability and impact in abstract terms. For instance, what is the probability of a criminal act? We can use statistics about, say, white collar crime in corporate settings as a starting point for assessing the risk. There are statistics describing the probability of certain acts in certain situations along with average impacts (including their statistical distribution).

But how can we assess a specific threat where there is no historical or statistical data to illuminate the analysis? That’s where military-style threat analysis can be very useful. Military threats are broken into two parts: capability and intent. Capability is self-explanatory: What can the potential or actual enemy do? What are the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of his forces? How many tanks can he deploy? How many aircraft? In the case of North Korea, how many nuclear bombs, of what type, and through what means can they be delivered? I discussed this at length in early September with Dr. Sean Maloney of RMC, an expert on nuclear history and strategy.

While there is uncertainty in capability assessment, at least we’re dealing with tangible realities. Intent is a completely different ballgame. How do we know what the enemy will do? How will he react to our own threats or efforts at conflict resolution? These are imponderables and we must consider a range of scenarios to determine the inevitable commonalities that arise in each, so we can prepare for them. We must also examine the action-reaction cycles that occur because of the moves and countermoves by both sides.

An analogous approach can be used in analyzing and assessing business threats, even though the stakes are obviously of a completely different order and importance. Whether you’re trying to assess your competitors’ next moves, or your market’s reception of your new product, you can learn a lot by considering the threat as both capability and intent. This allows you to disentangle what is possible (given assessed capabilities) from what is probable (given assessed intentions) over a range of scenarios. The insight gained can then be incorporated into your own strategy and contingency planning.

© 2017 Alcera Consulting Inc. This article may be used for non-commercial use with proper attribution.

Strategic Readiness Bulletin Number 2 – 8 September 2017

By Richard Martin, founder and president, Alcera Consulting Inc.

Richard Martin issues Strategic Readiness Bulletins on an as needed basis to clients, key decision-makers, and other influencers, to highlight recent or evolving risks, threats, and opportunities for companies and organizations resulting from chaotic change as well as international and national situations of a political, economic, technological, or social nature.

It was my great pleasure to interview Dr. Sean Maloney on 7 September 2017 on the topic of North Korea and nuclear weapons. We explored a number of issues and questions:

Copyright : Michael Borgers

  • Does North Korea really have nuclear weapons?
  • If so, what kinds and how many?
  • Is the threat credible?
  • What are the means of delivering these weapons?
  • Who is most threatened?
  • How can this threat be countered or deterred?

Sean is an international expert on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. As you’ll hear, he doesn’t just parrot what you hear in the media. I’m sure you’ll find it most enlightening, no matter what your interests and point of view.

 

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is a Professor of History at Royal Military College of Canada and served as the Historical Advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff of the Canadian Army during the war in Afghanistan. He previously served as the historian for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army’s primary Cold War NATO commitment after the re-unification of Germany and at the start of Canada’s long involvement in the Balkans. Dr. Maloney has extensive field experience in that region, particularly in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia from 1995 to 2001, where he inadvertently observed the activities of the Al Qaeda organization and its surrogates. His work on the Balkans was interrupted by the 9-11 attacks. From 2001 Dr. Maloney has focused nearly exclusively on the war against the Al Qaeda movement and its allies, particularly on the Afghanistan component of that war. He traveled regularly to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014 to observe and record coalition operations in that country and was the first Canadian civilian military historian to go into combat since the Second World War. He has authored fifteen books, seven of which deal with the Afghanistan war, as well as the controversial Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1946-1970 and Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 1951-1970.

You can find out more about Sean at his website www.seanmmaloney.com.

© 2017 Alcera Consulting Inc.

 

 

by Richard Martin

It’s Saturday morning and I’m sitting in my hotel room in Dubai. I’m here to conduct courses in strategic and operational management and leadership. I’m pondering the power of a vision and the means to achieve it.

I first was in the United Arab Emirates in December of 2002, as I prepared to deploy to Kuwait as the Canadian Forces Liaison Officer to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command prior to the invasion of Iraq. I was able to get into the city of Dubai on a few occasions with some of my colleagues for some R&R. The city has grown a lot in just those 15 years, and even since I started conducting courses here in 2014.

It’s gaudy and slick, hyper-modern and traditional, avant-garde and retrograde, all at the same time. If you like cutting edge architecture in the most bizarre locations with basically nothing around it, then you must visit Dubai. The skyline looks impressive from the sea, but when you’re in the city, all you see during the day is buildings, roads, and a haze combining humidity and dust and the beige-grey desert merging into the same coloured sky on a horizon that you can never quite make out. At night, it’s lights everywhere, sometimes quite pretty. Not as gaudy as Las Vegas, but still extravagant.

What is it about cities in the desert that makes them so attractive to adventurers and admirers alike? There is really nowhere to walk, as everything is designed around roads and a superb metro system. But even if you could walk, you wouldn’t want to for most of the year, as it’s extremely hot and humid. As I write, it’s forecast to go up to 45 C today, but the humidex is predicting 81 C!

The United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is the most famous state, was founded in the early 1970s under the visionary leadership of Sheikh Zayed, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi has most of the oil, but Dubai has the chutzpah and international reputation. The current ruler of Dubai is Sheikh Mohammed, who acceded to the post upon the death of his older brother in 2006, but who was also the de facto ruler for a decade before that.

It’s hard to believe, but as late as 1965, the city had a population of only 20,000. Most of these were huddled close to the Dubai Creek, a small inlet from the Persian Gulf. It was a marketplace, but the majority lived off fishing and pearl diving! Now, it’s a global trade and financial centre, and increasingly a manufacturing location and tourist destination. People from around the world come here to work, to make money, and to play.

Most of what Dubai is today, from Emirates Airlines (based in Dubai), the Burj Khalifa (the tallest freestanding building in the world), to the Palm Jumeirah (artificial islands shaped like a palm tree), is a result of the vision and leadership of Sheikh Mohammed. One of his many books is available for sale everywhere, appropriately titled My Vision. As prime minister of the UAE, in 2010 he issued a long-term federal vision for the country, called Vision 2021. Not many countries are led this way—essentially as an integrated organization.

It’s an interesting study in the power of vision combined with the resources to achieve it. Contrary to expectations, though, the city isn’t built on oil money. Exactly the opposite; it’s designed to avoid dependence on oil and natural resources. A possible example for many other jurisdictions around the world.

© 2017 Alcera Consulting Inc. This article may be used for non-commercial use with proper attribution.

Since the IS-perpetrated terrorist strikes in Paris there has been surge of “advice” and debate on the best strategy to adopt against the Islamic State in the Middle East. The problem is that most of the discussion confuses tactics with strategy and then presents these as mutual exclusive. Air strikes are not effective. No, air strikes are the way to go. No, we need to put boots on the ground. Actually, no. We need to concentrate on humanitarian action.

In reality, all of those approaches are needed in order to create dilemmas for IS and its operatives. You have to take the fight to the enemy by seizing and maintaining the initiative. Air power must be combined with ground forces in order to achieve maximum synergy and effect on the battlefield. You can knock out a command post, but that only creates a delay and temporary confusion. You can buy a bit of time, but it’s all much more effective when you can hit a command post and use the ensuing confusion to launch a ground assault. Moreover, you have to realize that a command post is a physical entity, but a headquarters with its commander and staff are a team. Command, control and communications (C3) can be degraded, but it is much harder to eliminate them entirely, especially if the enemy has a very decentralized structure with competing factions.

Here is a non-exhaustive listing of other thrusts in the strategy:

  • Economic warfare to disrupt the enemy “home front” such as it is,
  • Financial warfare to disrupt and interrupt the flow of funds, because gold is the sinews of war,
  • Humanitarian aid to support the non-belligerent population and refugees,
  • Psychological warfare against foreign and home-grown terrorist threats,
  • Information warfare to degrade the enemy’s psychological and media warfare capabilities and build up domestic and foreign support to fight IS, and
  • Numerous other aspects of combat, kinetic and non-kinetic.

The basic point here is that you need a strategy that attacks and “pinches off” IS wherever it tries to operate. IS combatants in a theatre of war must be treated as prisoners of war, while those who have perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity must be treated as such. IS and allied terrorists operating in other nations must be treated as criminals.

Another critical point is to realize that there is no such thing as a “war on terrorism.” You can fight an identified enemy, opponent or belligerent group. You can’t fight a tactic, much less a vague concept.

Richard Martin is The Force Multiplier. He brings his military and business leadership and management experience to bear for executives and organizations seeking to radically improve performance, grow, and thrive in the face of rapid change, harsh competition, and increasing uncertainty.

© 2015 Richard Martin. Reproduction and quotes are permitted with proper attribution.