by Richard Martin

There’s a claim going around on social media that the Iranian strike on Israel was just a face saving move after Israel took out key military targets in Damascus last week.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Iran launched 300 or so systems in a mix of long- and medium range missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. But 99% or so were destroyed in the air. We even have video of an extra atmospheric interception, which is evidence of successful BMD. Imagine if only 10 or 20% of those vectors had hit targets, however inaccurately. Would people be commenting as if it were the latest episode of 90 Day Fiancé?

It looks to me like one of two possibilities. Either it was intended as a sophisticated attack to create dilemmas for the IDF defences so something could get through to its target; or it was a hail mary, throw everything but kitchen sink. Either way, the strike failed. I don’t think Iran is poised to do anything further, and is basically a sitting duck.

by Richard Martin, President, Alcera Consulting Inc.

I originally wrote this paper in 2002 for a graduate seminar in Theories of War for a PhD in War Studies at Royal Military College of Canada. I will probably update it in the future, but for now it provides a good primer on the way to assess wars and conflicts in the 21st century. You may forward any comments or suggestions directly to me, at info@alcera.ca.

Rather than reproduce the full paper here, I’ve created a pdf version for download. Feel free to quote and share with appropriate attribution.

Introduction: “The First of All Strategic Questions”

The critical task of the strategist in any situation of conflict is, first, to understand the nature of warfare and conflict in general, and second, to understand the nature of the war one is involved in.  This “first of all strategic questions” is critical, for the consequences of error have a direct bearing on the survival and interests of a state.  As Handel has shown, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Corbett, and Mao are all in agreement on this basic point.[1]

While these theorists hint at the judgment criteria that a strategist must follow to determine the nature of a war, none, except for Clausewitz, provides anything that could be considered a holistic theoretical model for explaining and describing conflict and warfare.  Furthermore, Clausewitz maintains that there is no substitute for genius and coup d’oeil. This may have been sufficient in the early part of the nineteenth century, although one suspects that Clausewitz’s attempt at formulating a general theory of the conduct of war is an implicit recognition that this is not sufficient.  War and conflict in the modern world are so complex that it is doubtful that any one individual or group possesses anything like the experience required to make an intuitive judgment on these matters.

What the strategist requires, then, is a proper framework for analyzing and assessing any situation of political conflict which can potentially lead to armed confrontation and war.  The aim of this paper is to provide the outlines of just such a strategic framework of analysis.

Various models have been proposed to explain the gradations, types, and varieties of conflict and war.  These include several “spectrums of conflict”, Kahn’s ladder of escalation[2], and conflict typologies (guerrilla war, revolutionary war, protracted war, total war, etc.).  Spectrums of conflict have been invented based on ends/means analysis (limited vs. total war), as well as the intensity of operations (high, medium, and low intensity war/operations).  This latter categorization schema has also been linked to the requirements of international intervention for conflict management, such Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace.[3]  A full comparison of these approaches to the understanding of war is beyond the scope of this study.  However, it is assumed that none of these models provides a ready-made framework, nor even the basis for development of one, that would allow the systematic analysis of wars and conflicts.

On the other hand, Clausewitz does provide a kind of model for determining the nature of any war – the social “trinity” of government, army, and people – and puts it to use in Book Eight of On War in analyzing the history of armed conflict in Europe.  While the “trinitarian” model has some serious limitations, it does provide a basis for a fully developed theoretical model for determining and analyzing the nature of wars and conflicts, both inter- and intrastate.

This paper will focus on developing this model further, to the point where it has some heuristic value in analyzing conflict and war.  To do so, it must be understood that the state, as a historical form of social organization, is fundamental to war and political conflict in general.  Clausewitz’s trinity will then be used as a basis for further developing this historical insight into a full-blown hierarchical model of the state as a “war-machine”.  The state-hierarchy model of war will then be used as a framework for analyzing war and conflict in the modern world.

This is a purely theoretical discussion concerning the nature of war and strategy.  The state-hierarchy model of war that is developed herein is not meant in any way to describe the actual functioning of any state.  Rather, it is a heuristic device for understanding the nature of war and conflict.  By stating that war is fundamental to the state and that the state is fundamental to war, the intent is to highlight the fact that the most basic function of the state is to protect itself from internal and external threats to system integrity.  This model has limitations, but a discussion of these will be left to the conclusion so that the reader can develop an overall appreciation for the concept and its workings before attempting a critique of the method.


[1] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War:  Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd, Revised and Expanded Edition, London:  Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 91-117

[2] Herman Kahn, On Escalation:  Metaphors and Scenarios, New York:  Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965

[3] See for instance, Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Autumn 1999, pp. 4-20.

By Richard Martin

I am frustrated at the obstinacy of Western apologists of Russian aggression, terrorism, and imperialism. This article provides responses to the most common “talking points” excusing Russia’s invasion and destruction of Ukraine and bullying of NATO countries.

I am tired of having to read and respond to uninformed and illogical statements concerning Russia’s destructiveness, aggression, threats, and coercion by individuals who can’t argue a point properly. I just can’t take these people seriously.

I admit it. I lose my cool sometimes, but that’s because claiming “moral equivalence” or spouting “what-about-isms” are a waste of time. Worse, they pollute public dialogue and debate because they are off topic, unethical, and play right into the hands of foreign powers seeking to undermine our national defence, security, and institutions.

Uninformed statements are put forth by individuals trying to debate with serious authors and experts as counterpoints to well-argued and evidenced arguments. The problem is that the so-called counterarguments or debating tactics are nothing more than rehashed talking points from Russia’s lies, threats, and misdirection. Those repeating them have not bothered to read any history by actual historians or reporting by credible, professional journalists. They just assume that what they have heard in a sound bite or a read in a tweet is true and worthy of debate. It isn’t.

For example, there is a popular, but false and uninformed “argument,” that NATO threatens Russia. It’s a pure Russian talking point. Another “debater” stated that the war in Donbas is a civil war. No, it isn’t. It was instigated by Russia in early 2014 in response to the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and continues as part of Russia’s invasion and war against Ukraine since then, especially since 24 February 2022. Apparently, that individual had never heard of Russia’s “little green men,” a.k.a. Wagner Group, or the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014.

These types of uninformed and false claims are easily refuted by doing a quick search on Wikipedia (or through other online sources, including mainstream media). For example, see Little green men: Russo-Ukrainian WarRussian occupation of Crimea; and War in Donbas (2014-2022).

At the very least, reading such articles should give one pause that the situation and historical background is much more complex than can be encapsulated in sound bites and tweets. Read my articles on why NATO is not the aggressor, but Russia is. I also invite you to read the works of Keir Giles on Russia’s aggression and coercion, specifically, his books Russia’s War on Everybody: And What it Means for You, and Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West.  It should also cause someone to think that maybe they don’t have enough background information to make a proper assessment of the soundness of pithy catchphrases and 10-second videos on YouTube™.

But that is apparently too much work for some people. After all, why try to develop a deeper understanding of the historical and political background of a social problem when you can just repeat something that sounds clever and feeds into your pre-existing biases, cynicism, fear, and anxiety about war and conflict? I get it. War is hell, but the fact that you don’t like war and fear it doesn’t make it disappear.

Another false claim I’ve read is that, somehow, “NATO invaded Afghanistan.” It is part of a wider trend of presenting “moral equivalence” statements as serious counterarguments. In logic this is known as the “tu quoque” fallacy: Literally, “so did you!” Anyone who has children knows that the go-to defence after being caught doing something wrong or dangerous is to claim that “He/she/they/you started it/did it too/did it first.” Can we see how puerile that is?

It is a logical fallacy because it doesn’t address the proposition, logic, or evidence that is adduced by the author of the original argument. In simple terms, saying that so-and-so does it too doesn’t counter the logic or content of the author’s position. It merely deflects it to hijack or confuse the debate. What started as a presentation of evidence and logically linked propositions leading to one or more conclusions becomes a discussion over something unrelated to the intent of the original author or one putting forth an argument.

If someone wishes to debate or discuss whether NATO “invaded” Afghanistan or not, or anything else for that matter, fine. Go ahead, state your starting position in your own article or post. Don’t contaminate others’ writings with your sophomoric tactics in an amateurish attempt at debate. Put it on your own website or blog! See if someone will take you up on it. On the other hand, if you wish to engage in genuine dialogue, debate, or commentary on an article or post with its author, you should at least try to be on point.

For instance, say someone wishes to debate the author of an article that provides reasoned arguments, with propositions, logical links, and evidence in favour of his position. The way to do that is to address the content of the text and its logic. If the original author says that Russia invaded Ukraine and provides logical arguments and evidence in favour of that position, the correct way to debate or discuss these is to provide counterevidence and genuine counterarguments. Highlighting the original author’s faulty logic or reasoning is also fair game, so long as one has valid points to make.

But showing a map of Europe that indicates the year that countries joined NATO doesn’t prove or argue in favour of NATO aggression. It may be the case that the expansion of NATO as indicated by the map is evidence of anti-Russian sentiment. But it doesn’t follow that the sentiment proves that the countries involved, or the NATO alliance, are aggressive. The opposite is the case. The eastern European countries and their citizens were and remain so concerned about Russian aggression and coercion that they asked to join NATO and were accepted by consensus of then member nations. Moreover, defensive alliances are specifically mentioned as legitimate and inhering in the right to self-defence in the Charter of the United Nations, which the Russian Federation claims to uphold.

Furthermore, one must weigh any claims within a wider political, economic, and social context. NATO was in Afghanistan to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under a UN Security Council resolution. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, and could have vetoed it, but didn’t. ISAF was thus the result of a wide international consensus that assistance to the Afghanistan government was needed for a variety of reasons. In addition, there were non-NATO countries that participated in the operation.

But even if that were not the case, even if NATO had “invaded” Afghanistan, that still would not constitute a sound argument in debating someone about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. That’s simply a “non sequitur,” which translates as “it does not follow.”

The final point I wish to address is about qualifications and expertise. We live in a society where everyone’s opinion on just about any matter seems to be taken seriously. The problem is this: Not everyone’s opinion is valid. There is a psychological phenomenon known as the Dunning-Kruger Effect. It states that the less some people know about a topic, the less these same people claim expertise.

The most interesting aspect about the Dunning-Kruger effect is that most people, when learning more about a topic, develop less confidence in their knowledge and expertise. They obviously realize that their initial impressions and reactions were uninformed. Then, as they acquire more and more knowledge and experience, their confidence level rises again, but never to the levels of the ignorant who claim expertise with little or no real knowledge. 

Knowledge is a universal acid; it dissolves overconfidence born of misinformation and ignorance. It also gives us humility. Socrates claimed to be the wisest man in all of Greece, not because he knew a lot, but specifically because he realized that he didn’t know everything, or even very much. This type of humility would be valuable to anyone who wishes to debate well-informed experts, who have the knowledge and practical experience to make reasoned judgments.

© 2024 Richard Martin

by Richard Martin

If I were Israel, I’d have mined the sea approaches to Gaza, set up acoustic and seismic sensors on the seabed, and have regular sea patrols to prevent anything coming in and out. Right now, other than what is provided through the IDF and coming in at Rafah, Israel seems to have effectively sealed off Gaza.

Note that Egypt has a massive wall along its border with Gaza and is closely controlling ingress and egress, probably in close collaboration with Israel.

The reason this is coming to a head is that Israel is winning. Hamas is being ground down to a nub, with most of their fighters dead or captured, and Israel effectively eliminating the leadership. Israel will do what it takes to destroy Hamas and anyone who supports them, while continuing to keep Hezbollah at bay.

One of the claimed reasons for the humanitarian is to increase deliveries of humanitarian aid directly to Palestinians (i.e., NOT through the IDF). They tried air dropping supplies, but people were being bonked on the head in the mad rush to access them. Air drops also can’t meet the quantities supposedly required. Meanwhile, Hamas and their UNRWA allies continue to commandeer what they can. Also, there are videos of Gazans ambushing delivery trucks coming from Egypt at the Rafah crossing point and assaulting/lynching truck drivers.

Here is the sequence so far:

1. People claim Israel isn’t doing enough, while commandeering/stealing what IS coming in through Egypt and funnelling it to Hamas.

2. Let’s try air dropping humanitarian supplies. That’s not enough and is killing people for various reasons.

3. Let’s bring in humanitarian supplies by sea. That means we need a temporary pier. This the current situation.

If Israel lets this go beyond point 3, then the following, future sequence will occur:

4. That temporary pier is not enough. Let’s build a permanent pier and a permanent bridgehead. Supplies start moving in bulk under Hamas control.

5. Hamas leadership escapes into the Mediterranean while arms and military supplies are moved in. Also, more fighters.

Par Richard Martin

J’aimerais commencer par décrire une antinomie archétypale, le centre contre la périphérie. Le centre est le cœur du “territoire exploré”, pour reprendre l’expression de Jordan Peterson, c’est-à-dire ce qui est connu et considéré comme sûr et sans danger. Cependant, le territoire exploré devient moins connu, moins sûr et moins sécurisé à mesure que nous nous déplaçons vers la périphérie. À la périphérie la plus extrême se trouve l’inconnu, l’insécurité, l’incertitude. Ce qui conduit à l’anxiété et à la peur. C’est le domaine des dragons.

Le cœur de cette terre, ce territoire exploré, est le plus sûr, le plus sécurisé et le plus convoité de tous. Que ce soit à l’échelle cosmique, terrestre ou tribale. Au centre du cosmos se trouve l’arbre-monde. C’est le poteau qui soutient la tente des cieux, le pivot autour duquel tourne le firmament, l’axis mundi. Le firmament retient les eaux des cieux, qui peuvent à tout moment faire irruption, provoquant des déluges et des catastrophes, ou des pluies vivifiantes. La terre flotte sur les eaux souterraines, où se cachent dragons, vers, serpents et autres monstres et terreurs. Et les morts. Parfois, les cieux sont soutenus par les piliers de la terre, chacun situé aux quatre coins, d’où viennent les quatre vents.

Au centre de notre terre, nous, les êtres humains (le nom de la plupart des peuples dans leurs langues), nous avons nos sources sacrées. Ou notre bosquet sacré. Les rochers, les arbres ou les trous d’où sont sortis nos ancêtres, le premier homme et la première femme. Parfois, le premier homme a été créé en premier par le Créateur, souvent à partir de son sperme. Parfois, la Première Femme a été créée en premier, ou était simplement le Cosmos qui est devenu le Monde et le Peuple. Nous sommes le Premier Peuple, né de la Terre elle-même. Nous sommes les autochtones, les indigènes. Le premier mot est grec et signifie “jaillir de la Terre”, le second est latin et signifie “être créé ici”.

Nous, les êtres humains, sommes les enfants du premier homme et de la première femme, ou parfois leurs petits-enfants et arrière-petits-enfants, les descendants des héros qui ont combattu et tué le dragon, ou qui ont trouvé la terre ferme après le déluge. C’est pourquoi nous devons honorer et aimer nos ancêtres. Ils nous ont aimés et protégés lorsqu’ils étaient dans cette vie. Aujourd’hui, ils vivent dans le monde des esprits. Nous devons faire en sorte qu’ils soient heureux et satisfaits, afin qu’ils continuent à nous aimer et à prendre soin de nous. Sans l’aide et la protection de nos ancêtres, comment pourrions-nous survivre et nous épanouir ? Comment pourrions-nous nous protéger des mauvais esprits contrôlés par nos ennemis, les Autres, qui veulent tuer les êtres humains ?

Nous, les êtres humains, avons émergé de notre mère, la terre. Elle est notre grande mère et nous devons prendre soin d’elle. Si nous, ses enfants, prenons soin d’elle et la protégeons, elle prendra soin de nous, elle nous nourrira, elle nous protégera. Mais nous devons rester humbles devant son immense pouvoir et son amour. Sinon, elle nous dévorera tout entier.

Dans le campement, nous avons également un périmètre. Il peut s’agir d’un kraal zoulou, d’un muret ou des murs extérieurs de l’enceinte familiale. Souvent, le campement est disposé en cercle, avec un foyer au milieu et une périphérie protégée par des murs extérieurs, des clôtures, … ou des fossés. À l’extérieur de l’enceinte familiale ou clanique se trouve le hameau. Ce sont les habitations et les concessions de nos proches. Ils ont également une disposition centre-périphérie de leurs maisons. Juste après la propriété familiale ou le hameau se trouvent les champs, ou les pâturages pour le bétail. Les femmes s’occupent des champs, qui sont souvent leur propriété. Les jeunes hommes s’occupent du bétail, avec l’aide des garçons. Les hommes plus âgés et les anciens se réunissent au centre du village ou du hameau. Ils discutent des idées du jour, règlent les différends, débattent des questions de guerre et de paix. Au centre, la partie la plus sûre et la plus sacrée de l’habitation. Près de l’arbre central ou du pilier. Les anciens forment le sénat (senatus en latin, qui signifie conseil des anciens).

Les protecteurs doivent patrouiller à la périphérie pour s’assurer qu’il n’y a pas de prédateurs qui peuvent pénétrer. Ils sont à l’affût des intrus, qui peuvent venir voler, violer et piller. Ils peuvent essayer de nous tuer, de voler nos femmes, de détruire nos récoltes, ou pire encore. Ils essaient de nous conquérir ou de nous anéantir. Nous devons donc établir un périmètre à partir duquel nous pouvons surveiller (Wacht am Rhein) et contrer toute menace. La grande muraille de Chine. Le mur d’Hadrien. Le limes romain.

Les protecteurs qui veillent sur le périmètre sont des gardiens. Ce sont nos héros. Ils sont à l’affût des envahisseurs, des ennemis dangereux. Dans les sociétés primitives – subtribales, nomades (en fait, semi-nomades, car ils occupent et défendent un territoire qu’ils parcourent au gré des saisons), horticoles et agricoles tribales – les intrus et même les simples vagabonds étaient souvent tués à vue. On tire d’abord, on pose des questions ensuite. La croyance voulait que les intrus soient le signe d’un pire avenir. Même un individu isolé ou un petit groupe de chasseurs pouvait être le signe avant-coureur de futurs groupes de guerre.  L’idée était que les terrains de chasse et de fourrage du groupe attireraient l’intérêt des groupes voisins. Même un vagabond solitaire pouvait rapporter de “bonnes nouvelles” à son groupe sur les bonnes récoltes à faire de l’autre côté de la rivière, dans la vallée suivante ou au-delà de la forêt.

Monter la garde à la périphérie en établissant un périmètre de sécurité était donc tout à fait rationnel. Et continue d’être tout à fait rationnel. C’est aussi un bon point de départ pour explorer au-delà du pays d’origine, pour trouver de nouvelles ressources et pour mener des raids préventifs contre les maraudeurs et autres, tout en obtenant des informations importantes, en menant des reconnaissances et en ramenant du bétail, des femmes et des guerriers capturés en tant que butin de guerre et esclaves. Le cheptel humain pouvait également être intégré à la tribu ou à la bande pour compenser les pertes antérieures dues à la guerre, à la famine ou à la maladie, et assurer ainsi la pérennité du groupe. Le groupe était (est) la forme la plus importante de richesse, de protection et de sécurité.

Mais il y a aussi des sources d’insécurité à l’intérieur du groupe. Il peut s’agir de sorcières, de sorciers, de magiciens, qui jettent des sorts, manient le mauvais œil, conjurent les mauvais esprits. Ou peut-être simplement des personnes qui parlent dans le dos. Chuchotements. Planifier. Conspirer. Dans une telle société, les hommes – toujours les hommes – doivent préserver leur honneur avec soin. Il faut des années, voire des décennies, pour accumuler suffisamment de mana, d’orenda ou de manitou pour être intimidant ou pour rallier d’autres personnes à sa cause. Et tout cela peut être détruit en un seul instant si l’on perd la face. Pourquoi suivre un homme quand il peut être si facilement vaincu, battu, insulté, déshonoré ? Le statut est tout ce qu’il y a de plus important. La richesse, les femmes, les guerriers ne sont que des moyens d’accumuler le plus de pouvoir spirituel possible.

Mais pourquoi les autres voudraient-ils voler le pouvoir d’un homme ? Envie, jalousie, ressentiment. Il y a trop peu pour tout le monde. Comment a-t-il pu amasser autant de richesses et de guerriers ? D’où vient tout ce bétail ? Pourquoi ses champs (ou plutôt ceux de ses femmes) sont-ils si riches ? Pourquoi les femmes se jettent-elles sur lui ? Ce ne peut être qu’en maniant les mauvais esprits. Ce ne peut être qu’en communiant avec le diable. Il est sorcier. Il est magicien. Son esprit est fort. Il faut le faire descendre d’un cran ou deux. Ou l’éliminer. Ses femmes et ses filles peuvent être réaffectées et mariées. Elles peuvent s’occuper des champs et servir les hommes. Les garçons et les jeunes peuvent également se joindre à l’arriviste ou à l’usurpateur, puis s’occuper du bétail et protéger le périmètre pour le nouveau grand homme.

Cela nécessite une stratégie. Il faut de la planification, de la connivence. De la conspiration. Le Grand Homme n’est donc pas irrationnel de croire que d’autres veulent ce qu’il a, qu’il s’agisse de son pouvoir, de sa richesse, de ses femmes, de ses guerriers. Des forces obscures rôdent autour de lui et veulent l’évincer et faire de lui un esclave ou un “homme de pacotille”. Elles conspirent dans l’ombre et utilisent la magie des mauvais esprits. On peut conjurer les morts et leur faire faire ce que l’on veut. Le Grand Homme a raison de se méfier. Il doit rester humble en apparence. Il doit utiliser son mana pour régler les différends. Lorsqu’il le fait, il doit payer. Il peut s’agir d’une chèvre. Ou une promesse de lui venir en aide en cas de besoin. S’ils font un raid et capturent des femmes, des esclaves et d’autres biens, il peut les partager avec ses alliés les plus proches. Mais toujours, toujours, il doit paraître humble, généreux, indulgent (mais sans jamais oublier ?), rusé, magnanime. De peur de paraître trop menaçant pour les autres, les arrivistes, les ambitieux. Souvent ces jeunes qui sont plus intelligents, plus forts, plus rusés que les autres.

2024 Richard Martin

By Richard Martin

I’d like to start by describing an archetypal antinomy, centre versus periphery. The centre is the core of “explored territory,” to use Jordan Peterson’s term for what is known and considered secure and safe. However, explored territory becomes less known, less safe, and less secure as we move to the periphery. At the most extreme periphery, lies the unknown, the unsafe, the non-secure. Which leads to anxiety and fear. Here be dragons.

The core of this ground, this explored territory, is the safest, most secure, and most coveted of all. Whether on the cosmic, the earthly, or the tribal scales. At the centre of the cosmos is the world-tree. It is the pole that holds up the tent of the heavens, the pivot around which revolve the firmament, the axis mundi. The firmament of the sky holds back the waters of the heavens, which can burst through at any moment, causing deluge and disaster, or lifegiving rains. The earth floats on the waters below, where lurk dragons, worms, serpents, and other monsters and terrors. Sometimes, the heavens are held up by the pillars of the earth, each located at the four corners, where the four winds come from.

At the centre of our land, we, the Human Beings (the name for most peoples in their languages), lie our sacred springs. Or our sacred grove. The rocks or trees or holes from which emerged our ancestors, First Man and First Woman. Sometimes, First Man was created first by the Creator, often from his semen. Sometimes, First Woman was created first, or was simply the Cosmos who became the World and the People. We are the First People, born from the Earth herself. We are the autochthonous ones, the indigenous ones. The first is Greek for “springing from the Earth,” the second is Latin for “being created here.”

We, the Human Beings, are the Children of First Man and First Woman, or sometimes, their grandchildren and great grandchildren, the descendants of the Heroes who fought and killed the dragon, or who found dry land after the Flood. Which is why we must honour and love our Ancestors. They loved us and protected us when they were in this life. Now, they live on in the spirit world. We must keep them happy and satisfied, so they will continue to love us and care for us. Without the help and protection of our Ancestors, how could we possibly survive and thrive? How could we protect ourselves from the evil spirits under the control of our enemies, of the Others, who want to kill Human Beings.

We, the Human Beings, emerged from our mother, the earth. She is our Great Mother, and we must care for her. If we, her Children, care for her and protect her, she will care for us, she will nurture us, she will protect us. But we must be ever humble before her enormous power, and love. Or she will devour us whole.

Now in the settlement, we have a perimeter also. It can be a Zulu kraal, or a low wall, or the outer walls of our family compound. Often, the settlement is laid out in a circle, with a hearth in the middle, and a periphery, protected by outer walls, fences, … or ditches. Outside the family or clan compound lies the hamlet. These are the homesteads and compounds of our relatives. They also have a centre-periphery layout of their homes. Just beyond the homestead or hamlet are the fields, or the range for the livestock. The women tend the fields, which are often their property. The young men tend the livestock, with the help of the boys. The older men and the elders gather at the centre of the village or hamlet. The discuss the ideas of the day, resolve disputes, debate issues of war and peace. At the centre, the safest and most sacred part of the habitation. Near the central tree, or pillar. The elders form the senate (senatus in Latin, which means council of elders).

Protectors must patrol the periphery to ensure that there are no predators who can penetrate. They are on the watch for intruders, who can come to steal, rape and pillage. They might try to kill “us,” steal our women, destroy our crops, or worse. They try to conquer us or wipe us out. We must therefore establish a perimeter, from which we can keep watch (Wacht am Rhein) and counter any threats. The Great Wall of China. Hadrian’s Wall. The Roman Limes.

The protectors keeping watch at the perimeter are guardians. They are our heroes. They are on the lookout for invaders, dangerous foes. In primitive societies – sub-tribal, nomadic (actually, semi-nomadic, for they occupy and defend a territory over which they range with the seasons) foragers, and tribal horticultural and agricultural societies, intruders and even simple wanderers would often be killed on sight. Shoot first, ask questions later. The belief was that intruders were a sign of worse to come. Even a lone individual or small party of hunters could be a harbinger of future war parties.  The idea was that the group’s hunting and foraging grounds would attract the interest of neighbouring groups. Even a lone wanderer might bring “good news” back to his group about the great pickings to be had just over the river, in the next valley, or beyond the forest.

To stand guard at the periphery by establishing a secure perimeter was therefore entirely rational. And continues to be entirely rational. It also provides a good jumping off point for exploring beyond home country, to find new resources and to conduct pre-emptive raids against marauders and others, while gaining important information, conducting reconnaissance, and bringing back livestock, women, and captured warriors as war booty and slaves. The human stock could also be integrated into one’s tribe or band to offset prior losses due to war, famine, or sickness, and thus ensure the continued existence of the group. The group was (is) the most important form of wealth, protection, and security.

But there are also sources of insecurity inside the group. These may be witches, sorcerers, magicians, casting spells, wielding the evil eye, conjuring evil spirits. Or maybe just talking behind one’s back. Whispering. Planning. Conspiring. In such a society, men – always men – must guard their honour with care. It can take years, decades even, to build up enough manaorenda, or manitou to be intimidating, or to rally others to one’s side. And it can all be destroyed in a single moment by losing face. Why follow a man when he can be so readily defeated, beaten, insulted, dishonoured? Status is everything. Wealth, women, warriors, they are only means to the end of building up as much spiritual power as possible.

But why should others want to steal a man’s power? Envy, jealousy, resentment. There is too little to go around. How could he amass so much wealth and warriors? Where did all that livestock come from? Why do his fields (or rather, those of his wives) yield so much bounty? Why do women throw themselves at him? It can only be from wielding the evil spirits. It can only be from communing with the devil. He is a sorcerer. He is a magician. His spirit is strong. He needs to be brought down a notch or two. Or eliminated. His wives and daughters can be reassigned and married off. They can tend the fields and serve the men. The boys and youths can also join the upstart or usurpers, and can then tend the livestock and protect the perimeter for the new Big Man.

This requires strategy. It requires planning, conniving. Conspiring. So, the Big Man is not irrational to believe that others want what he has, whether it be his power, his wealth, his women, his warriors. There are dark forces lurking about who want to unseat him and make him a slave or a “rubbish man.” They are conspiring in the shadows, and they are working their magic with the evil spirits. The dead can be conjured and made to do one’s bidding. The Big Man is right to be wary. He must remain outwardly humble. He must use his mana to adjudicate disputes. When he does so, he incurs payment. It may be a goat. Or a promise to come to his aid should he need it. If they go on a raid and capture women, slaves, and other prizes, he can share them with his closest allies. But always, always, he must appear humble, generous, forgiving (but never forgetting?), shrewd, magnanimous. Lest he appear too threatening to others, the upstarts, those with ambition. Often those youths who are smarter, stronger, shrewder than others.

There is a deep-seated inclination to organize space into symbolic centres and peripheries, which underpins psyche and society. These enduring patterns of human behaviour highlight the universal quest for security against the unknown, and this symbolic architecture helps to grasp the complexities of human world through time.

© 2024 Richard Martin

(Extracted with small changes from Brilliant Manoeuvres: How to Use Military Wisdom to Win Business Battles.)

By Richard Martin

Strategy and the Strategic Level of War

There are three levels of war: strategy, operational art, and tactics and these play out in the physical and moral planes. This paper explains these concepts and their relationships.

In its purest form, strategy is the theory and practice of raising and employing military forces to achieve political ends. Historically, it is only in the modern period that states have consistently raised and maintained large standing forces. There were exceptions in the past such as in ancient Rome, but they were few. To raise and maintain an army for any length of time, one must be able to both justify its existence and to finance it. The first need is largely political in nature; this means you must have a good reason to create and maintain the army. The second need follows logically from the first because soldiers, weapons and their upkeep require huge amounts of capital, labour, time, and money. They are a huge drain on a country’s treasury and resources.

As Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, “Warfare is the greatest affair of state; it must be thoroughly pondered and studied.” The raison d’être of the army and its payment, equipping and financing require considered attention from politicians and the highest military commanders. However, it isn’t enough to have an army or any other type of armed force. One also must know how to employ it judiciously. Theorists usually distinguish between “grand strategy,” which involves the political leadership of the country in making fundamental existential decisions and setting goals, and “military strategy,” the realm of military leadership, which involves the actual employment of military forces to achieve political ends. In other words, grand strategy is about setting war aims and broad parameters for action including the political, social, and financial mobilisation of the country, and military strategy is about actually fighting the war, whether it is all-out war or a more limited form of conflict or deployment of forces. 

Tactics and the Tactical Level of War

Tactics are the theory and practice of achieving immediate aims in the heat of battle. One way to remember the distinction between strategy and tactics is to look at their etymologies. As noted previously, strategy comes from the Greek word for general. Generals usually aren’t involved in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy unless something has gone terribly wrong. Tactics comes from the Greek term taktike, which means to arrange or order things. In other words, tactics refer to how to arrange troops on the field of battle and manoeuvre them to achieve success. I sometimes use a mnemonic device that helps to distinguish between the two and explains their inherent meaning. When thinking of strategy, think of “stratosphere,” in other words, strategy implies one is at an altitude, overlooking the battlefield but not getting bloodied or muddied. When thinking of tactics, think of the word “tactile,” in other words, actual contact, and combat with the enemy. 

Strategy and tactics also differ in terms of how they are conceived, developed, and communicated. Strategy is somewhat amenable to systematization, but it is ultimately very artful. No two situations or organizations will ever call for the same strategy. It also requires great intelligence and opportunism. Tactics, on the other hand, are inherently repetitive, mechanical, and process oriented. Should such-and-such occur, or the enemy follow a course of action, then take the following action. If that doesn’t work, then try this other action. Tactics are therefore easy to systematize and indeed must be systematized and as a result, tactics can be taught and evaluated. In summary, we can say that each strategy is ultimately unique, whereas tactics are repeatable.

Operations and the Operational Level of War

In centuries past, the levels of strategy and tactics covered the whole of warfare. This was because military forces were smaller, more ephemeral, and less capable with shorter range of action and less staying power. Armies were raised for purposes of war when there was a clear threat or when a ruler wanted to conquer another state. Soldiers were often paid from the proceeds of campaigning, even by rape and pillage, and were expected to live off the land, at the expense of its inhabitants. There was no personnel management, discipline was harsh and inhumane by modern standards, and logistics basically involved raising taxes or stealing money to pay for the war or goods to feed and arm the soldiers. In addition, armies were poorly articulated. This meant that units had few sub-divisions, were mostly uniform in form and function, and tended to be deployed in simple close-order formations using only mechanical manoeuvres learned by rote. 

The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon changed all of that. Probably for the first time in history, a country raised huge armies consisting of untrained conscripts armed with standard weapons and formed into large articulated units with fairly consistent leadership. Napoleon’s Grande Armée also included large artillery forces, heavy and light cavalry, engineers, and a corps d’intendance, an administrative element that accompanied armies to ensure their supply and maintenance in the field. The French army was huge by existing standards. It therefore required a whole different level of organization and structure. Consequently, balanced divisions consisting of all arms were created, and these were then grouped into army corps and field armies, under generals of progressively higher rank. Senior command was attributed almost solely based on competence in battle. Furthermore, political ideology and propaganda became part of the armoury of the French nation at arms. This was truly a formidable and frightful force. 

The French had multiple enemies in different directions and had to fight enemies on many fronts simultaneously for years on end. Whereas wars had until then tended to be rather short, they were now protracted, intense, and costly. The old strategy and tactics were clearly insufficient. The French, therefore, developed the first notions of “operational art,” and this level became increasingly elaborated throughout the 19th century, reaching its full development in the world wars and modern theories of war. In a nutshell, operational art is the theory and practice of combining campaigns and battles to achieve war aims and to create the conditions for battlefield success, whether these are material, human or technical. To do so, you need to develop clear war aims, campaign plans, permanent staffs of specialized planners, communication methods, intelligence analysts, and logisticians to create detailed operational plans and orders. 

These domains all support the aim of achieving strategic success by enabling and supporting successful tactical execution. Operational art and its various technical and managerial manifestations are the conceptual glue that links strategy and tactics.

Planes of War

War and conflict must also be considered in terms of the physical and moral planes. The physical plane comprises the material underpinnings of war and conflict: force ratios, weapons characteristics, material resources, money, people, etc. However, every historian, theoretician and practitioner of war and conflict knows that war and conflict occur just as much in the head and heart as on the field of battle. History is full of examples of large armies being defeated by much smaller forces. This is because psychological forces can sometimes be just as effective and efficient as physical forces. This is why leadership, morale, cohesion, subterfuge, surprise, and cunning are so fundamental to success in battle and in conflict in general.

© 2012-24 Richard Martin

by Richard Martin

All through the period since September 2021 when the US became convinced that Russia was preparing to attack Ukraine, there has been consistent strategic signalling by the US, UK, and NATO, including revealing locations of carrier battle groups, SSBNs and SSGNs (the latter things never done during the Cold War), surveillance flights near the Russian borders, continued training of Ukrainian forces, as well as providing financial, economic, and military assistance by NATO and other like-minded countries. These display capabilities and intentions clearly to the Kremlin and the Russian high command.

Every Russian threat to “escalate” has been countered with clear signalling that has deterred the Russians from doing anything even more stupid. The Ukrainians have been using a version of the ATACMS and Storm Shadows since last fall, so any fears of angering Putin have been overtaken by events. I have heard of a concern by some within the Biden administration that providing the newer longer range versions of ATACMS could encourage the Ukrainians to use them against targets in Russia. I think that’s bogus, because the US is already providing targeting from space and air assets. The Russians know that already.

In any case, Ukraine has been blowing up oil installations and military targets all over Russia since early December, at the latest, using drones and covert attacks.

© 2024 Richard Martin

By Richard Martin

An acquaintance has asked why some in the West are accusing our governments of cowardice for not sending more weapons and equipment to Ukraine to help in its war to expel Russia from the occupied zones. Some of it has to do with support to Russia or fear of provoking Russia, but cowardice is a meaningless blanket term that doesn’t help with any kind of planning or assessment.

However, I believe the main concern has to do with the need to shore up NATO war stocks, especially of 155 mm shells and things like ATACMS missiles (fired by MLRS or HiMARS batteries), as well as air-launched cruise missiles like the German-Swedish Taurus and the Franco-British Storm Shadow. All of these are in limited supply until production can be fully ramped up. European countries have been investing heavily in ramping up production over the last year or so, after they realized that the war in Ukraine was going to last much longer than anticipated. Even in WW2 it took years for the US and other allies to ramp up war production to the needed levels. One of the lessons that is being relearned in Ukraine is the level of ammo usage, especially artillery.

We also must consider the ongoing Russian threat against front-line NATO partners from Kaliningrad (see map). Russia has dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) Iskander missiles and bombers based in K-Grad that can strike up to 500 km away. That doesn’t count other elements like bombers deep in Russia capable of launching cruise missiles out of range of any NATO air defence system, as well as warships in the Caspian Sea with long-range strike capabilities.

NATO must balance all of these factors, i.e., the need to maintain conventional deterrence against Russian threats, not just nuclear deterrence, as well as their own capabilities. I think that there has been considerable pressure by certain Western powers on the Ukrainian government to step up their recruiting, training, and management of their ground forces so they can put more men in the field and sustain operations beyond initial breakthroughs. I think the US and UK have also been putting a lot of pressure on Ukraine to do more weapons production themselves.

One area where things seem to be moving well is in ramping up the equipping of the Ukrainian air force with F-16s. I think this is something that will come into play by the summer. The recent changes to the high command of the Ukrainian forces by President Zelensky will also have an effect over the medium term.

© 2024 Richard Martin

Battlefield AI

Posted: February 4, 2024 in War
Tags: , , , ,

By Richard Martin

War is evolving before our eyes, and it’s hard to gauge the full impacts long or short term.

AI has been used for years for sensor fusion, e.g., for staff planning and command decision-making. Systems like the SM2 air defence missiles on warships depend heavily on AI processing already. Same goes for the helmets of F-35 pilots. What happens when the Apple Vision Pro starts being used in a few months for battlefield tasks?

Another point is that missiles have been largely if not totally autonomous for decades. Whether guided or ballistic, missiles have been pretty much fire and forget since the air-to-air Sidewinder was introduced in the late 50s and the first ICBMs.

Think of the Javelin antitank missile. It has something like a 2-km range and, when fired, acquires a target, and can hit it without further guidance from the gunner or firing platform. Tanks and other AFVs are increasingly being fitted with defensive systems that integrate AI. I read about a Merkava in Gaza that had activated its active defensive system twice to counter RPGs while the crew was completely unaware that they had been engaged. They only realized it afterwards when they got out of their tank and saw the systems had worked automatically.

The real issue at this stage is whether there will be truly autonomous systems that can seek and destroy targets based on facial recognition and other biometric or situational information. Whether or not that is technically feasible, I don’t think it will happen, because there is a need to maintain positive control throughout the kill chain. Look at how the IDF has insisted on maintaining the human in the loop in Gaza, despite the ability to fire and forget.

AI-enhanced, remotely operated systems are here now and will continue to develop. As with all AI, I don’t see it replacing the human in the loop, but it will be used more and more as a force multiplier and to enhance lethality, protection, and mobility. To me, AI is fundamentally no different than using a backhoe to dig a hole rather than a spade.

© Richard Martin